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Introduction 
This paper has been written as a background essay for 
the Conference on Financial Crisis, Foreign Assistance, and 
Domestic Resource Mobilization in the Caribbean Basin, to be 
held at The Ohio State University.!/ Central America is 
going through the most critical period of its recent 
history. Geopolitical, social, and economic problems in the 
region far surpass the difficulties experienced in the 
1930s, during the Great Depression, and the consequences of 
the present crisis will reach beyond the sphere of economic 
events, shaping the institutional framework and the politi-
cal and social fabric of the countries in the area. The 
region's destiny will be molded during the next few years, 
and the ways in which the present political and economic 
problems will be solved will determine the type of society 
and the level of ~elfare to be experienced by Central 
Americans during the rest of the century. 
Although most of the world's attention has concentrated 
on the political dimensions of the Central American crisis, 
concern for the region's economic difficulties has not been 
missing. Numerous policies and programs have been proposed 
to deal with these issues.~/ In particular, the preliminary 
ideas contained in the Caribbean Basin Initiative have been 
expanded by the Report of the National Bipartisan Commission 
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on Central America (the Kissinger Report). This Commission 
has urged "the immediate adoption of an emergency stabiliza-
tion program combining public and private efforts to halt 
the deterioration," as well as a medium- and long-term 
reconstruction program. 3 / The most important component of 
these recommendations has been a substantial increase in 
u.s. bilateral financial assistance to the region. 
The disbursing of large amounts of financial aid, 
however, may be a far more complex and difficult exercise 
than the Kissinger Commission would imply. 41 Although the 
Commission recognizes that "large-scale economic aid alone 
does not guarantee progress,"~/ and that ''the effectiveness 
of increased economic assistance will depend on the economic 
policies of the Central American countries themselves,"~/ 
the Report is very unsatisfactory when facing these problems 
and offering solutions. If experience in other countries 
teaches us anything, increased availability of foreign 
financial assistance tends to undermine the policy reforms 
that are necessary to face the crisis. Indeed, the "coffee 
boom" episode and the accompanying expansion of the external 
debt of the Central American countries suggest that large, 
temporary inflows of funds may not be sufficient to promote 
development and stability. To understand why this may be 
the case, one needs to examine the causes of the present 
economic difficulties. Although this has been done at 
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length elsewhere, this paper attempts to summarize the main 
determinants of economic crisis in Central America.ll 
In its analysis of the current economic conditions and 
their causes, the Kissinger Commission indicates that 
"adverse international and financial developments, natural 
disasters, ineffective economic policies within Central 
America, structural economic weaknesses, and high levels of 
violence have combined to produce inflation, a decline in 
economic activity, capital flight, and problems in servicing 
debt." 8 / Although this list includes several important 
determinants of the crisis, the intense effort required to 
understand the complex and interdependent issues examined by 
the Commission may explain their superficial approach to the 
economic problems of the region. Particularly striking is 
the lack of emphasis on the choice of development strategy 
as one of the structural determinants of the crisis. Also 
missing from the Report are a discussion of the role of the 
domestic financial system in mobilizing resources for deve-
lopment, as well as an analysis of the potential impact of 
large inflows of foreign financial assistance on the perfor-
mance of domestic financial markets. The main objective of 
the present paper is to explore the role of the financial 
sector in mobilizing domestic resources, to evaluate the 
past performance of the Central American financial markets, 
to examine the importance of financial and related economic 
policies in shaping that performance, and to consider the 
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probable impact that largely increased foreign financial 
assistance may have on the performance of domestic financial 
markets and on the policies that regulate them. 
A first section reviews the causes of the present eco-
nomic crisis in an stilyzed fashion. Both long-term, struc-
tural determinants, and short-term influences are taken 
into account. The importance of financial deepening in 
economic development is briefly explored next, through an 
enumeration of the services provided by an efficient finan-
cial system. Another section examines the process of finan-
cial deepening in Central America during the 1960s and the 
1970s. It shows that lack of inflation and exchange-rate 
stability resulted in substantial financial deepening, 
despite lack of explicit concern with the mobilization of 
domestic savings. The following section investigates the 
impact that the crisis has had on the real size and perfor-
mance of the domestic financial system. Finally, the paper 
speculates about the potential impact of increased flows of 
foreign financial assistance on policy reform, postponement 
of the adjustment, domestic resource mobilization, and 
financial deepening in Central America. 
Development strategies, external shocks, and crisis 
During the 1980s, the Central American countries have 
been in the midst of an acute economic crisis, characterized 
by stagnant or contracting outputs, by a rapid decline of 
their exports and imports, by growing unemployment, by large 
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public-sector deficits and public external debts, by rapid 
inflation and the explicit or implicit devaluation of their 
currencies. These difficulties have been in sharp contrast 
with a record of rapid economic growth during the previous 
two decades, particularly during the second half of the 
1970s.~! 
These problems have reflected, in part, the instability 
and recession conditioning most of the Latin American 
countries in the early 1980s. Their magnitude and pecu-
liarities have responded, however, to some of the most basic 
characteristics of the Central American economies. In effect, 
the crisis has resulted from a combination of long-term, 
structural trends, and of very unfavorable short-term cir-
cumstances (coyuntura) both abroad and at home. (See Chart). 
The long-term determinants of the crisis have reflected 
a contradiction between some of the region's most basic eco-
nomic characteristics and some of the main features of the 
protectionist strategy of development adopted in the late 
1950s. The structural determinants of the crisis have also 
been associated with the increasing size of the public sec-
tor and the changing role of the state in the economy. 
These long-term circumstances explain much of the stagnation 
and rigidity of these economies, the growing unemployment 
and underemployment, and the accelerating inflation that has 
resulted from expanding fiscal imbalances. The short-term 
circumstances, on the other hand, have included both sizable 
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external shocks as well as inappropriate policy decisions in 
response to these shocks.lO/ 
The main economic characteristic of the Central 
American countries is their small size, with all the limita-
tions imposed by a poor domestic market. By itself, each 
one of the Central American countries constitutes a 
miniscule and nonviable economy. Even the whole of Central 
America, with a population of about 22 million inhabitants 
and a gross domestic product (GOP) of about u.s. $20 
billion, is a very small market. It is equivalent to any 
American city of about two million inhabitants. No city of 
this size ever dreams of being economically self-sufficient. 
Given a small domestic market and a narrow resource 
base, these economies have been extremely dependent on 
international trade for an efficient allocation of resources 
and as an engine of growth. During this century much of the 
impulse for growth has been provided by exports of coffee, 
bananas, sugar, beef, cotton, and a few other primary com-
modities. Small size has inevitably resulted in very open 
economies, extremely vulnerable to the impact of external 
shocks. 
With the adoption of a strategy of industrialization 
via import substitution, consolidated by the formation of 
the Central American Common Market, these countries hoped to 
reduce their external dependence and to achieve some degree 
of self-sufficiency. Although their strategy inplied free 
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trade among themselves, in an effort to overcome the small 
size of their individual markets, they also erected a com-
mon, highly protective tariff barrier against imports from 
other countries. That is, while increasing their openness 
with respect to one another, they hoped to reduce it with 
respect to the rest of the world, as the regional market 
looked more dynamic, stable, and predictable than the inter-
national market. 
Obviously, this is no longer the case. Furthermore, 
Central America has never been a large market, but market 
size is crucial for successful industrialization. In the 
early stages of import substitution, growth was made 
possible by the replacement of previously imported com-
modities with domestic production for the captive market. 
This stage was eventually completed, as easy opportunities 
for import substitution were exhausted by the mid-1970s. 
High protection, in turn, made it impossible for the manu-
facturing sector to compete in international markets. 11/ 
In summary, the contradiction between small market size 
and a strategy of development that emphasized production of 
manufactures for the domestic market eventually restricted 
growth potential, while high costs resulted from the distor-
tions introduced and the accompanying penalization of agri-
culture and of exports. 
Moreover, the strategy did not reduce dependence on 
imports. The common tariff structure favored the production 
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of final consumer goods at the expense of intermediate 
inputs and of raw materials, resulting in a highly import-
intensive manufacturing sector. As a consequence, the 
Central American economies have become increasingly depen-
dent on their imports of raw materials, intermediate inputs, 
and capital goods. To acquire them, they have continued to 
rely on their traditional exports of primary commodities. 
Further, the protectionist strategy did not reduce 
the region's dependence; it only changed its nature. 
Previously, dependence was associated with consumption 
patterns; now, it is associated with productive structures. 
These economies not only have become more vulnerable to 
external shocks, but also have lost their flexibility to 
adjust to these inevitable shocks. Balance-of-payments 
adjustment now involves a contraction of imports of raw 
materials and thus a corresponding reduction of production 
and employment in the manufacturing sector. These con-
sequences, in turn, have resulted in efforts to postpone the 
adjustment, usually through increased borrowing abroad. 
This postponement has greatly increased the social costs of 
the adjustment.l2/ 
Because they are very small and very open, the Central 
American economies are extremely vulnerable to the impact of 
external shocks. After 1973, they experienced a sequence of 
unusually large shocks, which included the two international 
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oil crises, a sharp increase and later decline of the inter-
national prices of their export commodities (the "coffee 
boom"), followed by the world recession, and equally sharp 
changes in the terms and conditions of their access to 
international financial markets. War, insurrection, and 
political instability have reinforced the unfavorable 
shocks, further reducing the viability of the Central 
American Common Market and leading to capital flight and a 
contraction of domestic investment.~/ 
An important component of the recently increased econo-
mic instability of Central America has been a large swing in 
its international terms-of-trade. These terms-of-trade 
deteriorated sharply around 1974, as a consequence of the 
first oil crisis. However, they improved dramatically 
during the "coffee boom" (1976-77), to rapidly deteriorate 
again afterwards. This has been a very violent fluctuation 
in a short period of time. As a result, real incomes have 
also suffered a tremendous fluctuation, which has created a 
difficult problem of adjustment. 
The rapid expansion of export earnings associated with 
the "coffee boom" significantly increased aggregate 
spending: consumption augmented, government expenditure even 
more, and imports even more. Further, aggregate expenditure 
increased not only as a result of the extraordinary export 
earnings, but was also fueled by rapidly growing borrowing 
in international financial markets. Soon, spending reached 
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levels that could not be sustained under normal circumstan-
ces, much less during the recession that followed. 
Unfortunately, during these years the Central American 
governments made little effort to modify tax structures or 
to mobilize domestic savings through financial markets more 
effectively. As a consequence, the relative size of the 
public sector augmented, although not on the basis of 
increased tax revenues, but on the basis of external 
borrowing. The openness of the economy increased rapidly, 
as well, as long as international monetary reserves and 
access to international credit lasted.l4 / 
By the turn of the decade, once these societies had 
become addicted to unsustainably high levels of aggregate 
spending, the demand for their exports declined, their 
international terms-of-trade deteriorated, and political 
instability further contributed to a sharp contraction of 
private capital inflows. Real income and import capacity 
were curtailed. The introduction of import controls could 
not release this constraint, but it further aggravated 
pessimistic expectations. The time had arrived for aggre-
gate spending to grow more slowly, but such an adjustment 
faced much opposition. On the one hand, the manufacturing 
sector was extrenely dependent on imported inputs, while 
political constraints limited the magnitude of potential 
cuts in public (e.g., military and welfare) spending. To 
avoid the stagnation of manufacturing, the protected sector, 
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and the contraction of the public sector, where unions have 
been most powerful, the authorities borrowed heavily abroad. 
When foreign lenders decided that they did not want to 
finance the public-sector deficits of the Central American 
countries any longer, the authorities relied on financial 
repression and printed money as a tool to further postpone 
facing up to the consequences of the fall in income. These 
policies have led to a rapid loss of international monetary 
reserves, accelerating inflation, and the eventual deva-
luation of domestic currencies.~/ In the end, real con-
sumption and other forms of spending have declined, after 
all, but a heavy cost has been paid in terms of rampant 
inflation, capital flight, and a worsening distribution of 
wealth, that might have been avoided, at least in part, by 
policies to facilitate the adjustment. In particular, the 
burden of the foreign debt acquired to postpone the adjust-
ment will severely limit future opportunities for 
growth. 16/ 
In summary, as a consequence of structural trends and 
of unfavorable external shocks, the Central American econo-
mies have been experiencing a severe recession in economic 
activity. A serious drop in export earnings and the service 
of a large foreign debt have drastically reduced the flow of 
imports needed for production. Some of the factors contri-
buting to these conditions have been beyond their control, 
but others have reflected the way in which the authorities 
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have reacted to these events. The accumulation of too large 
a foreign debt, for example, has been mostly the result of 
attempts to postpone some of the unfavorable consequences of 
recent events. The situation has been difficult to manage 
because the unfavorable short-term shocks have been superim-
posed on a long-term trend of declining dynamism and produc-
tivity. To deal with these structural questions, however, 
requires important policy reforms. 
The importance of financial deepening 
Until recently, the role of the financial system and 
the nature of its contributions to economic growth in the 
less developed countries (LDCs) had received little atten-
tion. Although Schumpeter had recognized the role of 
finance in the unlocking of resources for innovation, 
investment, and growth, more recent theories of development 
had ignored financial activities or, at best, had treated 
them as passively adaptive. 17 / Several important theoreti-
cal developments anticipated a renewed interest in these 
questions. One was the formulation of monetary theory as a 
part of the theory of capital, which treated money as an 
asset alternative to other financial and tangible assets in 
wealth portfolios. 18 / Another one was the integration of 
monetary theory with the theory of economic growth. 191 A 
third contribution was the analysis of the connections bet-
ween financial development, the savings-investment process 
and real growth, pioneered by Gurley and Shaw.~/ Despite 
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these developments, the role of the financial system was 
excluded from the main traditions of theory and of practice 
with respect to the LDCs, until Shaw and McKinnon accorded 
money and the operations of the banking system a much 
greater degree of importance than had been previously 
recognized. 21 / 
Shaw insisted in looking at the financial system as 
just another productive sector, with its industries, 
markets, prices, institutions, and policies. In this sec-
tor, firms combine inputs, primarily human, according to 
relevant technologies, in order to produce a complex set of 
financial services, which Shaw saw mostly as intermediate 
inputs into another production processes. Financial ser-
vices are not costless~ supplying them is expensive in 
resources and their provision would be justified only to the 
extent that they increased aggregate productivity suf-
ficiently to compensate for their opportunity cost. 
The financial system provides several types of ser-
vices.~/ First, its most basic service is the provision of 
a universally accepted medium of exchange. This is the tra-
ditional role of money. In its absence, high costs are 
associated with transactions, market size and trade are 
restricted, opportunities for specialization and division of 
labor are limited, and the productivity of resources is low. 
Thus, the costs of barter include not only the value of the 
15 
resources spent in searching for trade partners, but also 
the losses of efficiency due to restrictions on market size. 
Second, the financial system provides services of 
intermediation between surplus (saving) and deficit 
(investment) units, thus enhancing the accumulation of capi-
tal and improving its allocation. 23 / In the absence of 
finance, economic agents can take advantage of their produc-
tive opportunities only to the extent allowed by their own 
endowment of resources, while in other cases are forced to 
invest their excess resources poorly. There is no reason to 
expect that those units where savings are generated are 
necessarily those with the best investment opportunities and 
highest growth potential. By making the division of labor 
between savers and investors possible, the financial system 
can channel resources to those activities where they can be 
most profitably employed. 
Through these intermediation services the financial 
system could contribute to the elimination of inferior uses 
of resources (that is, it could destroy uses with low margi-
nal rates of return), while at the same time making possible 
better alternative uses. This is accomplished to the extent 
to which the financial system offers wealthholders new 
assets (e.g., bank deposits) that are more attractive forms 
of holding wealth than the unprofitable alternatives thus 
eliminated. In turn, the intermediary would transfer claims 
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on resources towards those with better productive oppor-
tunities, which would otherwise remain unexploited. From 
this perspective, the financial system offers valuable ser-
vices not only to borrowers, but also to depositors, while 
improving the allocation of resources. 
Market fragmentation, the small size of transactions, 
high costs of information, and the uncertainties and risks 
characteristic of poor economies much increase the transac-
tion costs observed in the financial markets of LDCs.~/ 
As a result, the returns to savers are low, the total costs 
of funds to borrowers are high, the size of financial 
markets is small, and the volume of funds channeled and the 
variety of financial services provided are limited. 
Fragmentation and high and differential transactions costs 
also imply large dispersions of the marginal rates of return 
in the economy, which signal ample unexploited opportunities 
for improved resource allocation. Financial progress 
results from the reduction of these transactions costs and 
risks and improves the quality of the existing stock of 
capital through a reduction of the dispersion in marginal 
rates of return.25/ 
Transactions costs can be reduced by economies of scale 
and of scope, professional portfolio management, risk-
reducing diversification opportunities, the accumulation of 
information, and the development of bank "customer" rela-
tionships. They cannot be reduced by decree (i.e., usury 
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laws). Rather, interest-rate restrictions usually increase 
the total level of transactions costs imposed on actual and 
potential market participants and modify their incidence on 
borrowers, lenders, and depositors.26/ 
Third, the financial system provides reserve management 
services. Most economic units accumulate stores of value 
for emergencies or to take advantage of future investment 
opportunities. The financial system reduces the costs and 
risks associated with these precautionary and speculative 
reserves and, through the provision of "unused lines of 
credit," it reduces the size of the desired stocks of 
reserves, thus releasing resources for productive purposes. 
Fourth, the financial system provides services of 
fiscal support for the public sector. This is an important 
contribution, in view of the weakness of tax structures and 
of securities markets in LDCs. The financial system also 
contributes to the management of foreign exchange. 
In summary, economic development both depends on and 
contributes to the growth and diversification of the finan-
cial system. Financial deepening matters and financial ser-
vices are important ingredients in the growth process, to 
the extent that they provide incentives for increased 
savings and investment, and encourage savers to hold a 
larger proportion of their wealth in the form of domestic 
financial assets, rather than unproductive inflation hedges 
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and other money substitutes. The provision of credit is 
important, but deposit mobilization is important too. 
The extent to which these services are provided depends 
on the real size of the financial system {the degree of 
financial deepening) and on the efficiency of its perfor-
mance, as measured by the magnitude and dispersion of the 
transactions costs imposed on all market participants. The 
following sections explore the degree to which financial 
development in Central America has been successful in pro-
viding these crucial ingredients of economic growth. 
Financial Deepening in Central America 
In addition to being very small and very open econo-
mies, up to the mid-l970s the Central American countries 
were characterized by remarkable price stability. During 
the period of 1950 through 1969 the average annual rate of 
change of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) ranged from a high 
of 3.4 percent in the case of Nicaragua/ to a low of 0.3 
percent in the case of El Salvador, with rates of inflation 
in Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras in the 1.0 to 2.0 
percent range. None of these countries experienced double-
digit inflation until 1973.~/ Absence of inflation 
reflected the fact that these very open economies managed to 
keep their exchange rates fixed for long periods of 
time. 281 Given such openness and constant exchange rates, 
their domestic price level was determined by the inter-
national price level, during a period when inflation in the 
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United States and other industrialized nations was minimal. 
The maintenance of a fixed exchange-rate regime reflected, 
on the other hand, a revealed preference of the Central 
American countries for monetary stability. That is, the 
stable rate was made possible by the strict monetary 
discipline that is required by a fixed-rate regime. An 
explicit objective of all Central Banks in the region, fre-
quently emphasized, was the maintenance of "the external 
value" of the domestic currency. These Central Banks '1 knew" 
their monetary approach to balance-of-payments and exchange-
rate stability well and had practiced its implicit prescrip-
tions for a long time.29/ 
In effect, during the 1950s and the 1960s, the rate of 
monetary expansion averaged less than 10 percent per annum 
in each one of the Central American countries, despite the 
fact that real incomes were growing rapidly and that, given 
the low levels of monetization of the early years, the 
demand for money was increasing at an even faster pace. 30 / 
Between 1961 and 1971, the average (geometric) rate of 
increase of the money supply in a strict sense (M1 ) was 8.0 
percent per annum for the whole of Central America, and 
ranged between 5.4 percent in Guatemala and 12.0 percent in 
Costa Rica, the only country in the region that devalued 
during the l960s. 31 / During the same period, the average 
rate of increase of domestic credit was 11.0 percent per 
annum for Central America, ranging between 7.9 percent for 
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El Salvador and 17.3 percent for Honduras. 32 / Given 
moderate credit and monetary expansion, growing and open 
economies, and careful Central Banks, it is not surprising 
that inflation was alien to Central America until the 
mid-l970s. 
Absence of inflation and exchange-rate stability made a 
significant degree of financial deepening possible in 
Central America, despite the lack of explicit concern with 
deposit mobilization, as is reflected in Table 1 and in the 
detailed data presented in the Statistical Appendix. By 
1961, the financial system of the Central American countries 
was still comparatively small, as reflected by a ratio of 
the money supply (M2 ), in the broad sense of currency, 
demand, savings, and time deposits, and a few other close 
money substitutes, with respect to the GDP, of only 15.3. 
This was a reflection of comparatively low per capita 
incomes, small size of domestic markets, and the existence 
of large segments of the population not fully incorporated 
to organized markets. By then, however, the ratio of the 
money supply in a strict sense (Ml)' with respect to the 
GDP, had reached a level of 10.9, not much lower than those 
observed during the following two decades. That is, most of 
the "monetization" of the economy, and the provision of the 
first and most basic of the services of the financial 
system: the supply of a universal medium of exchange, had 
taken place during the 1950s and before, as relatively large 
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Table 1 
Central America: Ratios of Selected Financial 
Magnitudes with Respect to the 
Gross Domestic Product, 
1961-1981 (Percentages). 
Currency 
Demand deposits 
Money supply 
{Ml) 
Quasi money 
(domestic) 
Quasimoney 
(foreign) 
Quasimoney 
Money supply 
(M2) 
Money supply 
(M2 domestic) 
Domestic credit 
Private credit 
Public credit 
1961 
5.9 
5.0 
10.9 
4.0 
0.4 
4.4 
15.3 
14.9 
19.6 
16.1 
3.5 
1966 
5.5 
5.8 
11.3 
7.4 
0.2 
7.5 
18.8 
18.6 
23.9 
19.5 
4.4 
1971 
5.1 
6.4 
11.5 
10.6 
0.3 
10.9 
22.4 
22.1 
27.2 
22.4 
4.8 
Sources: Tables in the Statistical Appendix. 
1976 
5.a 
7.6 
13.4 
14.6 
1.0 
15.5 
28.9 
28.0 
32.8 
26.1 
6.6 
1981 
5.9 
6.3 
12.2 
13.8 
1.4 
15.2 
27.5 
26.1 
41.3 
25.0 
16.4 
22 
subsistence sectors had been progressively incorporated to 
the market economy of monetized transactions and banking 
habits had been acquired. 
The largest portion of the impressive process of finan-
cial deepening observed during the 1960s and the 1970s, 
therefore, was associated with quasimoney (that is, non-
monetary deposits). The ratio of quasimoney with respect to 
the GDP increased from 4.4 in 1961 to a maximum of 16.3 by 
1978. As a result, the ratio of the money supply in a broad 
sense (M2 ) with respect to the GDP reached 29.5 by 1979. 
The M2/GDP ratios observed in the mid-1970s were com-
paratively high among LDCs, particularly with respect to 
those that had already experienced sustained inflationary 
pressures and more acute financial repression. 33/ 
By 1961 there were already some differences in the 
degree of financial deepening observed among the Central 
American Countries. The Mz/GDP ratio was highest in El 
Salvador (19.7} and Costa Rica (18.0), intermediate in 
Guatemala (13.9), and lowest in Honduras (12.9) and 
Nicaragua (11.7), showing a loose correlation with per 
capita income. During the 1960s, the more rapid pace of 
financing deepening was experienced by Honduras. This 
country reached an Mz/GDP ratio of 24.7 by 1971, comparable 
to that of El Salvador (24.8) and higher than those of 
Guatemala (19.8) and Nicaragua (17.3). Costa Rica, which 
experienced the second fastest rate of financial deepening 
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Table 2 
Central America: Ratios of Selected Components of the 
Money Supply, with Respect to the 
Money Supply Broadly Defined (M2 ), 
1961-1981 (Percentages). 
Currency 
Demand deposits 
Money supply 
(Ml) 
Quasimoney 
(domestic) 
Quasimoney 
(foreign) 
Quasimoney 
Money supply 
(M2 domestic) 
Domestic credit 
Private credit 
Public credit 
1961 
38.4 
32.8 
71.2 
26.4 
2.4 
28.8 
97.6 
128 .. 1 
105.3 
22.9 
1966 1971 
29.3 22.9 
30.6 28.6 
59.9 51.5 
39.1 47.2 
1.0 1.3 
40.1 48.5 
99.0 98.7 
126.9 121.6 
103.7 100.2 
23.2 21.4 
Sources: Tables in the Statistical Appendix 
1976 1981 
19.9 21.5 
26.4 23.1 
46.3 44.6 
50.3 50.3 
3.4 5.1 
53.7 55.4 
96.6 95.0 
113.2 150.6 
90.3 90.9 
22.9 59.7 
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during the 1960s, by 1971 still showed the highest ratio 
(27.7) among the five countries. 
By 1978, Guatemala (24.5), El Salvador (30.7) and 
Honduras (31.6) had reached the maximum M2/GDP ratios 
observed by each one during those two decades {1961-1981). 
Nicaragua reached a maximum (39.4} by 1979, and Costa Rica 
(41.2) by 1980. The lower degree of financial deepening 
experienced by Guatemala may have reflected the persistence 
of large subsistence sectors, while the recent increase of 
the M2/GDP ratios in Nicaragua has been mostly a reflection 
of a rapidly contracting output. On the other hand, the 
very high ratios temporarily observed in Costa Rica during 
some of the most recent years have resulted from rapid 
expansion of domestic credit for the public sector, a 
question to be discussed later. 
The Statistical Appendix provides abundant information 
on the components of the money supply in Central America. A 
few aspects of their evolution are worth mentioning here. 
Currency held by the public amounted to u.s. $166 million 
by 1961 and, as a proportion of GOP, remained fairly stable 
during the two decades. The currency/GOP ratio for the 
whole of Central America ranged between 4.9 {in 1975} and 
6.5 (in 1979). In 1961 this ratio was lowest in Honduras 
(4.3} and highest in El Salvador (6.9), and during the 1960s 
showed a tendency to decline, except in Honduras. By 1971 
it ranged between 3.9 (Nicaragua) and 6.3 (Costa Rica}, and 
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during the late 1970s increased rapidly in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua, both as a consequence of GDP contractions and, 
probably, of the impact of war, insurrection, and change of 
political system on the banking habits of the population. 
In 1961, demand deposits in Central America amounted to 
u.s. $142 million, less than currency held by the public. 
The ratio of demand deposits with respect to the GDP then 
ranged between 3.8 (Honduras) and 7.3 (Costa Rica), and 
during the 1960s increased in all the countries, except 
Guatemala. A maximum of this ratio, of 7.9 for the whole of 
Central America, was reached in 1973, and then started to 
decline. That year (1973), this ratio ranged between 4.8 
{Guatemala) and 13.1 (Costa Rica). 
Between 1961 and 1971, currency held by the public 
increased 1.8 times, while demand deposits increased 2.6 
times (in nominal terms). Between 1971 and 1981, however, 
while currency increased 4.0 times, demand deposits 
increased 3.5 times. As reflected in Table 2, the propor-
tion of the money supply broadly defined represented by 
currency declined from 38.4 in 1961 to 18.7 in 1975, and 
slightly increased to 21.5 by 1981. On the other hand, the 
proportion represented by demand deposits remained fairly 
constant during the 1960s, but declined at an accelerating 
pace during the late 1970s. This suggests that, as infla-
tionary pressures mounted, transactions balances were kept 
in new forms, different from checking accounts, for which 
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the opportunity cost was high. In 1961, the ratio of demand 
deposits with respect to money, broadly defined, ranged 
between 29.3 (Honduras) and 40.9 {Nicaragua). Through the 
1960s and early 1970s it was comparatively low in Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador, and high in Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica. 
The M1/GDP ratio ranged, in 1961, between a.o 
(Honduras) and 13.8 (Costa Rica). During the 1960s it 
declined in Guatemala (where it was 8.9 in 1971), was very 
stable in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and increased in 
Honduras and Costa Rica {where it was 17.9 in 1971). This 
ratio reached a maximum of 20.4 for Costa Rica in 1973. The 
M1 /M2 ratio, on the other hand, steadily declined, from 71.2 
in 1961 1 to 44.6 in 1981. This reflected the increased 
diversification of the money portfolios of the Central 
Americans, as different types of quasimoney were incor-
porated through time, in order to more closely satisfy their 
diverse tastes for return, risk, and liquidity. In 1961 the 
M1 /M2 ratio ranged between 62.5 (Honduras) and 84.0 
{Nicaragua), while by 1981 it ranged between 33.5 (Costa 
Rica) and 50.0 (El Salvador). The declining ratio observed 
in Costa Rica during the most recent years can be clearly 
associated with the inflationary process experienced in this 
country. 
In 1961, the ratio of quasimoney with respect to the 
GOP ranged between 1.9 (Nicaragua) and 6.9 (El Salvador). 
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During the 1960s it increased rapidly in all the countries, 
to range between 7.8 (Nicaragua) and 13.2 (Honduras) by 
1971. During the 1970s it increased most rapidly in Costa 
Rica, but slowly in the other countries. It ranged between 
12.1 (Nicaragua) and 24.7 (Costa Rica) by 1981. On the 
other hand, the proportion of quasimoney with respect to 
money broadly defined (M2 ) was low in Nicaragua (16.0) and 
high in Honduras (37.5) in 1961. By 1971 this proportion 
ranged between 35.5 (Costa Rica) and 55.1 (Guatemala), and 
by 1981 it ranged between 36.9 (Nicaragua) and 66.5 (Costa 
Rica). 
u.s. dollar-denominated deposits with the domestic 
banking system have been included in the quasimoney figures, 
but they have been important only in Costa Rica, during the 
most recent years, as part of the process of currency 
substitution experienced by this country. 34/ For the whole 
of Central America, the relative importance of these depo-
sits denominated in foreign currency increased from 1.3 per-
cent of M2 in 1971 to 5.7 in 1979. They have existed in 
every country except in Guatemala. In Costa Rica, however, 
their relative importance increased from 3.1 percent of 
M2 in 1971, to 28.4 percent in 1981. In Honduras they 
reached a maximum relative importance of 5.8 percent in 
1978, but this proportion has declined in recent years. By 
1982, as a proportion of the GOP, these foreign-currency 
denominated deposits represented 9.8 percent in Costa Rica 
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and 1.1 percent in Honduras (where they had represented 1.8 
percent of GOP in 1978). 
This increasing mobilization of financial resources 
through the domestic banking system has made possible a 
rapid expansion of domestic credit. Between 1961 and 1971, 
the ratio of domestic credit of the banking system with 
respect to the GOP, for the whole of Central America, 
increased from 19.6 to 27.2. In 1961 this ratio had ranged 
between 11.8 (Honduras) and 31.9 (Costa Rica), while in 1971 
it ranged between 17.5 (Guatemala) and 36.6 (Costa Rica), 
after rapidly increasing in Honduras and Nicaragua. 
Through the mid-1970s there had been a close parallel 
between increases in domestic resource mobilization and in 
domestic credit from the banking system, as shown in Table 
2. During that period, domestic credit remained about 25 
percent above domestic resource mobilization, while this 
difference was accounted for by the use of foreign funds in 
supplying domestic credit. In the late 1970s, the ratio of 
domestic credit to GOP increased in all of the countries, to 
range between 25.0 (Costa Rica) and 79.3 (Nicaragua) by 
1981. The large increase in this ratio observed in 
Nicaragua and El Salvador has responded to sharp declines in 
output. These comparatively high levels of domestic credit, 
with respect to domestic resource mobilization, became 
possible through large increases in the use of foreign funds 
by the domestic banks. Thus, by 1981, domestic credit was 
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50 percent above domestic resource mobilization. At the 
same time, however, domestic credit for the private sector 
had declined, from 105 percent (1961) and 100 percent (1971) 
of domestic resource mobilization, to 90 percent by 1981, 
while domestic credit for the public sector, which absorved 
21 percent of domestic resource mobilization in 1971, was 
using 60 percent by 1981. 
Despite this increased degree of financial deepening, 
as measured by aggregate ratios of financial magnitudes with 
respect to the GOP, the Central American economies have con-
tinued to rely heavily on foreign savings for the financing 
of their domestic investment. Although it has been shown 
that savings and monetary balances tend to be complementary 
in Central America (particularly in El Salvador, Honduras, 
and Costa Rica), 35 / domestic savings mobilization has 
remained comparatively low in Central America. 36 / Moreover, 
domestic financial markets have remained highly fragmented 
(and of a mostly urban character). Only a small proportion 
of the total population has had access to the new financial 
services offered. Also, the loan portfolios of formal 
financial institutions have shown much concentration: among 
those with access to loans, few have captured the largest 
proportion of the funds loaned. (In the case of agri-
cultural loan portfolios, about 10 percent of the number of 
borrowers have received about 85 percent of the amounts 
outstanding). 37 / Moreover, high transactions costs have 
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been imposed on all financial-market participants, so high 
that they have excluded large segments of the Central 
American population from participation in formal credit 
markets.38/ 
Financial-market fragmentation has reflected poor 
resources, limited education and sophistication, and the 
isolation of many economic agents. Uncertainty, the small 
size of transactions, and limited access to information have 
significantly increased the costs of participating in orga-
nized financial markets. Fragmentation has also resulted 
from government intervention, in the form of interest-rate 
regulations, reserve requirements, differential redis-
counting mechanisms and loan-portfolio quota requirements, 
restrictions to entry, and other quantitative and qualita-
tive regulations of financial activities. All of these 
problems, and the degree of financial repression, have been 
accentuated by the recent economic crisis. The following 
section explores the impact of the crisis on the real size 
and performance of the Central American financial systems. 
Financial repression: the impact of the crisis 
The Central American financial systems have suffered 
significantly with the crisis, probably more than most other 
sectors of economic activity. There has been a fiscal 
reason for this. 39 / When the stagnation and contraction of 
real incomes in the early 1980s reduced the rate of growth 
of government-revenue collection (which in some cases became 
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negative, even in nominal terms), the Central American 
authorities faced substantial political and administrative 
constraints for an additional mobilization of domestic 
resources with the use of additional tools of conventional 
taxation. It became difficult to increase taxes in the face 
of economic recession, pessimistic expectations, and capital 
flight. Several tax reforms in Honduras, for example, did 
not bear any additional revenues. At the same time, given 
political instability and the government's short-run 
perspective, public-sector expenditures kept growing, 
increasingly above current revenues. The absence of any 
significant securities markets, on the other hand, precluded 
any substantial placement of government debt with private 
wealthholders.40/ 
Given this increasing discrepancy between public-sector 
revenues and expenditures, for a while the authorities 
financed their budget deficits by placing their debt abroad. 
This was very substantial in the case of Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, but also significant for the other countries. 
When the limit to the stock of public external debt that 
foreign lenders were willing to accumulate was reached, and 
programmed expenditures had not been reduced yet, the 
Central American governments forced the placement of their 
debt with the domestic banking system. 
The proportion of total domestic credit allocated to 
the public sector had remained fairly constant during the 
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1960s and early 1970s. For the whole of Central America, 
this proportion ranged between 16.7 percent (1968) and 20.1 
percent (1972), prior to the first oil shock. In 1961 it 
ranged between 12.9 percent (Costa Rica) and 25.1 
(Guatemala). By 1971 it ranged between 4.6 (Nicaragua, 
where it had declined sharply) and 27.4 percent (Guatemala). 
During the second half of the 1970s, however, this propor-
tion increased rapidly, to reach 43.8 percent, for Central 
America, in 1982. During this last year, the proportion of 
domestic credit devoted to the public sector ranged between 
33.7 (Honduras) and 50.6 percent (El Salvador). 
As a proportion of the GOP, domestic credit for the 
public sector increased steadily, from 3.5 (1961) to 21.5 
(1982). In 1961, this ratio ranged between 2.4 (Nicaragua) 
and 4.1 (Costa Rica), while in 1982 it ranged between 17.2 
(Guatemala) and 31.3 (Nicaragua). By 1982 it represented 
68.2 percent of domestic resource mobilization through the 
Central American financial systems. 
The attempt to finance public-sector deficits by 
placing government debt with the domestic banking system 
has resulted, therefore, in two consequences. On the one 
hand, there has been an expansion of domestic credit at a 
rate faster than the rate that would maintain domestic price 
stability and the "external value" of the domestic curren-
cies, thus breaking away with the old tradition of an 
exchange-rate target. On the other hand, there has been a 
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drastic change in the shares of the private and the public 
sectors in total domestic credit, and the private sector has 
been "crowded out" from bank loan portfolios. Too rapid an 
expansion of domestic credit, in turn, has been reflected by 
excess demands for foreign exchange, for uses recorded both 
in the current and capital accounts of the balance of 
payments. 
The Central American countries rapidly lost large 
stocks of international monetary reserves accumulated during 
the "coffee boom", further replenished by accelerating 
borrowing abroad. Large stocks of reserves and easy access 
to international financial markets meant that the exchange 
rate could be maintained fixed despite strong inflationary 
pressures generated by credit expansion. Ample availability 
of foreign-exchange reserves also facilitated the process of 
currency substitution and of capital flight that has taken 
place in some of the Central American countries. 
Eventually, as reserves were lost, import- and foreign-
exchange controls were imposed. These controls, although 
ineffective from an aggregate perspective, are actually used 
to ration scarce foreign exchange among competing uses. The 
rationing process, however, imposes high transactions costs 
on demanders of foreign exchange, implicitly increasing its 
"price". Also, parallel markets for foreign exchange have 
formed in all the countries, while Costa Rica, in par-
ticular, has allowed the "interbank" exchange rate to float, 
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in addition to a formal devaluation of its official exchange 
rate.41/ 
In summary, fiscal deficits have been financed with 
losses of international monetary reserves, additional 
foreign borrowing (and, recently, in the case of Costa Rica, 
with a moratorium on the payments of interest and principal 
on this debt), and finally with the inflation tax. In order 
to avoid this tax, Central Americans have replaced domestic 
financial assets with other assets (including foreign 
currency) and the immediate consequence of this 11 flight from 
domestic money .. has been a reduction in the real size of 
domestic financial systems. 
In real terms, the banking system of all the Central 
American countries has contracted during the past few 
years. 42 / This contraction has been least pronounced in 
Guatemala, where measured in constant quetzales-of-1975, the 
money supply in a broad sense (M2 ) reached a maximum of 
1,069 million by the end of 1978. In real terms, M2 had 
grown at an average (geometric) rate of 9.7 percent per 
annum between 1970 and 1977, but it only grew at a rate of 
0.3 percent per annum between 1977 and 1981. (It declined 
by 5.0 percent in 1979). Between 1970 and 1977, the money 
supply in a strict sense (M1 ) grew at a rate of 8.0 percent 
per annum to reach its maximum value of 449 million of 
constant quetzales in 1977. It declined at a rate of -3.3 
percent between 1977 and 1981, but recuperated in 1982. 
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Quasimoney, on the other hand, had grown at an average 
annual rate of 11.1 percent between 1970 and 1977, but grew 
only at a rate of 3.7 percent per annum between 1977 and 
1981 (including a decline in 1979). 
The contraction has been very dramatic in El Salvador, 
where political dimensions have been added to financial and 
economic circumstances. By 1977, the money supply in a 
broad sense (M2 ) reached a maximum of 1,683 million of 
constant colones-of-1975, after growing at an average rate 
of 9.2 percent per annum between 1970 and 1977. It has been 
declining, however, at a rate of -5.6 percent between 1977 
and 1982. The money supply in a strict sense (M1) reached a 
maximum of 854 million of constant colones by 1976, after 
growing at an annual rate of 11.2 percent between 1970 and 
1976. Between 1976 and 1982, however, it declined at a rate 
of -5.6 percent. Its level in 1982 was only 70.8 percent of 
its level in 1976. Quasimoney, on the other hand, grew at a 
rate of 9.7 percent per annum between 1970 and 1977, to 
reach a maximum of 870 million of constant colones. Between 
1977 and 1982, however, it declined at a rate of -5.5 per-
cent per annum. Its value during the latter year was 75.3 
percent of its value during the former year. 
In Honduras, by 1978 the money supply in a broad sense 
(M2 ) reached a maximum of 924 million lempiras-of-1975. 
Between 1970 and 1978, M2 grew at a rate of 10.1 percent per 
annum, but between 1978 and 1982 it declined at a rate of 
36 
Table 3 
Central America: Annual Rates of Growth of Selected 
Financial Magnitudes, in Real Terms, 
1978-1982 (Percentages). 
Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Costa Rica 
Money supply (M2) 
1978 4.2 2.8 14.1 15.7 
1979 5.0 5.5 8.6 11.1 
1980 1.6 - 13.8 2.4 1.3 
1981 2.8 0.5 3.7 9.9 
1982 17.2 5.0 6.3 - 17.6 
Quasimoney 
1978 7.6 1.7 11.7 19.3 
1979 7.0 
-
14.9 - 10.4 23.1 
1980 7.5 - 20.0 0.6 0.1 
1981 7.4 14.0 1.0 22.0 
1982 25.4 1.3 14.8 - 19.3 
Money supply (Ml) 
1978 0.2 4.0 17 .o 11.8 
1979 2.3 4.9 6.7 2.6 
1980 6.2 8.2 5.7 3.2 
1981 4.3 - 11.7 6.5 8.2 
1982 3.4 8.7 3.1 - 14.4 
Domestic Credit 
1978 7.1 1.4 12.4 18.1 
1979 3.5 6.1 1.0 22.0 
1980 21.2 8.1 5.3 7.0 
1981 22.1 7.5 2.2 - 30.4 
1982 29.1 1.7 2.4 - 22.4 
Private Credit 
1978 17.3 0.8 8.6 14.8 
1979 5.2 2.4 5.1 6.1 
1980 12.2 - 26.2 0.4 3.9 
1981 3.3 0.7 2.3 - 33.4 
1982 9.2 1.0 0.3 - 24.1 
Sources: Tables in the Statistical Appendix. 
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-1.1 percent per annum. Between 1970 and 1978, the money 
supply in a strict sense (M1 ) grew at a rate of 8.7 percent 
per annum, to reach a maximun of 431 million of constant 
lempiras. Between 1978 and 1982, however, this magnitude 
declined at a rate of -2.8 percent. Quasimoney, on the 
other hand, grew at a rate of 10.8 percent between 1970 and 
1978, but declined at a rate of -4.1 percent between 1978 
and 1981, from a maximum of 493 million of constant lempiras 
in 1978.43 / 
The contraction has also been dramatic in Costa 
Rica. 44/ The money supply in a broad sense (M2) reached a 
maximum of 10,994 million colones-of-1975 as late as 1981 
and then declined. However, when deposits with the banking 
system denominated in u.s. dollars are excluded from M2' 
this magnitude reached a maximum of 8,591 million of 
constant colones by 1980 and then declined. If dollar-
denominated deposits are not excluded, between 1970 and 1978 
real M2 increased at a rate of 17.7 percent per annum, but 
the 1982 level was about the same as that reached by 1978. 
If dollar-denominated deposits are excluded, between 1970 
and 1978 M2 grew at a rate of 16.7 percent, to decline at a 
rate of -4.5 percent per annum between 1978 and 1982. 
The contraction of the money supply in a strict sense 
(M1 } was very pronounced in Costa Rica. Between 1970 and 
1978 M1 had grown at an average rate of 11.3 percent, but it 
declined at a rate of -7.2 percent between 1978 and 1982. By 
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1982 its value was only 74.1 percent of its value by 1978. 
Between 1970 and 1979, quasimoney, including dollar-
denominated deposits, grew at the incredible rate of 27.8 
percent per annum, in real terms, but its 1982 level was 
similar to its 1979 level. When dollar-denominated deposits 
are excluded, however, between 1970 and 1979 quasimoney grew 
at a rate of 25.3 percent per annum but declined at a rate 
of -3.6 percent between 1979 and 1982. 
The rapid expansion of domestic resource mobilization 
through the banking system that took place during most of 
the 1970s made a rapid expansion of domestic credit, in real 
terms, also possible. In Costa Rica, for example, between 
1970 and 1978 domestic credit increased at an average rate 
of 13.4 percent per annum, and it continued increasing 
through 1980. During the last years of this period, this 
rate exceeded the rate of expansion of domestic resource 
mobilization due to increasing borrowing abroad by the 
banking system, and thus domestic credit reached a maximum 
of 13,670 million of constant colones of 1975, by the end of 
1980. In real terms, nevertheless, domestic credit declined 
by 30.4 percent in 1981 and by 22.4 percent in 1982. As a 
consequence, at the end of 1982 the real value of domestic 
credit was only 54.0 percent of its real value in 1980. 
That is, the inflationary pressures generated by the expan-
sion of domestic credit itself (in nominal terms} and the 
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loss of the country's international monetary reserves even-
tually resulted in a sharp contraction of the real value of 
domestic credit. In the race between growth of domestic 
credit in nominal colones and inflation, the latter was an 
easy winner. 
Between 1970 and 1978, in Cost Rica domestic credit for 
the private sector grew at an average rate of 11.5 percent 
per annum, but between 1978 and 1982 it declined at a rate 
of -16.5 percent per annum. At the end of 1982 the value of 
domestic credit for the private sector was only 48.6 percent 
of its value in 1978. On the other hand, domestic credit 
for the public sector grew at a rate of 24.1 percent per 
annum between 1970 and 1980, but then quickly declined, so 
that by 1982 it represented only 58.3 percent of the value 
reached in 1980. The lesson is clear: too rapid an expan-
. 
sion of domestic credit, in nominal terms, eventually 
resulted in a sharp reduction of this magnitude, in real 
terms. This was the case even with respec to domestic ere-
dit for the public sector, and despite the "crowding out" of 
the private sector from domestic credit portfolios. 
Although domestic credit has not experienced the same 
dramatic reversal in the other Central American countries, 
its behavior tells a similar story (with some lags). In 
Honduras, between 1970 and 1978, domestic credit grew at a 
rate of 10.6 percent per annum, but this rate dropped to 2.2 
percent per annum for 1978 to 1982. In El Salvador, between 
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1970 and 1977 domestic credit grew at a rate of 8.0 percent 
per annum, but it grew only at a rate of 3.6 percent per 
annum from 1977 to 1982. Only in Guatemala, where financial 
repression has been least, has domestic credit continued to 
grow rapidly. Between 1970 and 1977, domestic credit grew 
at a rate of 8.4 percent, while this rate increased to 14.6 
percent for the 1977-1982 period. 
The evolution of domestic credit allocated to the pri-
vate system more clearly illustrates the consequences of 
increased financial repression. In Honduras, credit for the 
private sector increased at a rate of 9.8 percent per annum 
between 1970 and 1978 to reach a maximum of 971 million of 
constant lempiras by 1978. Between 1978 and 1982, it 
declined at a rate of -1.8 percent per annum. In El 
Salvador, between 1970 and 1978 credit for the private 
sector increased at a rate of 6.8 percent, to a maximum of 
1,536 million of constant colones by 1978. It declined at a 
rate of -7.9 percent between 1978 and 1982. Its 1982 value 
was only 71.8 percent of its 1978 value. In Guatemala, on 
the contrary, while domestic credit for the private system 
increased at a rate of 6.6 percent per annum between 1970 
and 1978, it grew at a rate of 7.4 percent per annum between 
1978 and 1982. 
As a result of the contraction in the real size of the 
banking system, the ratio of M2 with respect to the GDP 
declined in all four countries. In Costa Rica, it declined 
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from 41.2 in 1980 to 28.8 in 1981, reversing the increasing 
trend observed during the 1970s. Moreover, if dollar-
denominated deposits are excluded from M2 , this ratio 
declined from 35.4 in 1980 to 20.6 in 1981. In Honduras it 
slightly declined from 32.1 in 1979 to 31.2 in 1980, and 
this rate, that had been growing very fast, stagnated during 
the most recent years. In El Salvador, the M2/GDP ratio 
reached a maximum of 32.9 in 1976, to decline for the 
following four years, to 29.3 in 1980, but then increased, 
not because of financial deepening, but due to too rapid 
reductions in GDP. In Guatemala it also reached a maximum 
in 1976, of 25.2, and declined to 22.6 by 1980. 
With this process of contraction of the financial 
system during the crisis, there have been important changes 
in the composition of credit portfolios. As indicated, the 
private sector has been "crowded out" from domestic credit 
portfolios in all the Central American countries, while the 
public sector has significantly enlarged its share. 45 / In 
Costa Rica, the share of the private sector had already 
declined from 87.1 percent (1961) to 79.4 percent (1975). 
This share, however, further contracted to 52.1 (1982). In 
Honduras, it had declined from 76.6 (1961) to 74.7 (1979}, 
to further fall to 66.3 {1982). In El Salvador, it had 
declined from 85.1 (1961) to 83.3 {1978), to drastically 
fall to 49.4 (1982). In Guatemala, it had fallen from 74.8 
(1961) to 69.7 (1978), to rapidly decline further to 50.4 
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(1982). Moreover, in all these countries, the contraction 
of the share of the commercial banks, as opposed to the 
share of the public sector, in Central Bank credit was even 
more pronounced than indicated by these figures. 
It is important to keep in mind that, while this con-
traction of the real flows of domestic credit, particularly 
for the private sector, took place, the flows of external 
credit were also being curtailed, and that the crisis has 
seriously reduced the real value of the working capital 
(owned financial resources) of most firms, too. Other 
changes in the structure of the banking system resulted from 
this non-uniform contraction of its components. In some 
countries, (e.g. Honduras), development banks have main-
tained a privileged access to Central Bank rediscounting and 
to funds from international donors, which have limited the 
extent of the reduction in the real value of their loanable 
funds. At the same time, however, significant portions of 
the portfolios of these publicly-owned banks have become 
overdue and may never be collected. Thus, although the real 
value of the stock of outstanding credit balances has not 
declined (as defaulted loans have not been written off), the 
real value of the annual flows of new loans has fallen 
substantially. 46 / Commercial banks have also lost some of 
their share of the market for deposits to savings and loan 
associations and to financieras, which have been able to 
offer more attractive interest rates on deposits. In Costa 
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Rica, "private banks", which have been allowed to offer 
long-term deposits only, have gained at the expense of the 
nationalized commercial banks, which have enjoyed a monopoly 
in the mobilization of demand deposits. The increasing 
share of "private banks" in this market has been due to the 
rigidity and obsolescence of the nationalized banking 
system, used to operate without competition, to the aggre-
sive behavior of the new "private banks", and to the support 
that these have received from international donors. (It is 
interesting to note that non-regulated and informal inter-
mediaries have also experienced spectacular gains at the 
expense of the commercial banks in the Dominican 
Republic). 47 / In some countries, particularly in Costa 
Rica, dollar-denominated deposits have gained at the expense 
of deposits denominated in domestic currencies.48 / The 
shares of various sectors of economic activity in domestic 
credit portfolios have also changed. The share of 
"productive" sectors, and particularly that of agriculture, 
have declined, at the expense of the share of real estate, 
commerce, and other "speculative" activities. 49 / The number 
of clients of banking institutions has diminished sharply in 
several of these countries. 
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Crisis and financial services 
Between 1960 and the "coffee boom" of 1976-77, the 
Central American countries experienced a substantial degree 
of financial deepening, as reflected by the steady in-
crease in the ratios of financial magnitudes with respect 
to the GDP, the establishment of a wider set of financial 
intermediaries, increased competition in financial markets, 
and the geographical expansion of the branch network.SO/ 
Financial growth was explained by the vigorous growth of 
output, in real terms, and by exchange-rate stability and 
the absence of inflation. The latter two factors, in turn, 
reflected cautious fiscal, credit, and monetary policies, 
aimed at maintaining exchange-rate and price stability. As 
a result, exchange-rate risks were minimal, and during most 
of this period interest rates were positive, in real terms, 
in all of the Central American countries. 51 / 
The events of the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, 
led to a reversion of this favorable trend. By the turn of 
the decade, the real size of the banking systems was shrink-
ing, loan portfolios were showing an increasing concentra-
tion in favor of a smaller number of larger borrowers, the 
numbers of bank clients were declining, and several finan-
cial institutions were experiencing severe default problems. 
All of this suggests that important changes were taking 
place with respect to the extent and relative degree with 
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which the Central American banking systems were providing 
different types of financial services. 
First, the opportunity cost of holding transaction 
balances in domestic currencies had increased. As a con-
sequence, the ability of these banking systems to provide 
the services of a stable medium of exchange was reduced. 
Since evasion of the inflation tax is very easy in such 
open economies, the reduced comparative advantage of 
domestic currencies in supplying monetary services resulted 
. . . 52; ~n currency subst~tut~on.-- Although currency substitu-
tion allowed economic agents to maintain the real value of 
their money balances, despite domestic inflation, it also 
limited the ability of the domestic financial system to 
provide other services important for growth and development. 
Second, because of the contraction, when measured in 
real terms, of both the domestic liabilities and the domestic 
assets of the banking system, less intermediation services 
between surplus (savings) and deficit {investment) units 
were provided. The degree of intermediation was reduced 
with the lower relative importance of domestic financial as-
sets in wealth portfolios, and with the "crowding out" of 
the private sector from bank credit portfolios. With the 
crisis, however, more expanded intermediation services were 
required, given changes in relative prices and in other 
dimensions of the economic environment that made a flexible 
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mechanism for resource reallocation necessary. Finan-
cial intermediation becomes more important during periods 
of economic adjustment. The Central American banking sys-
tems, however, were suffering from a reduced ability to 
provide these crucial services. 
Third, given high inflation and devaluation expecta-
tions, domestic financial assets became poor stores of 
value for precautionary and speculative purposes. With the 
contraction of the financial system, in real terms, the 
value of 11 unused lines of credit 11 to potential borrowers 
was reduced. While the search for inflation hedges, a more 
limited access to formal credit, and increased risks and un-
certainty may have contributed to a relatively larger 
demand for reserves, the Central American financial systems 
were in a less favorable position to supply these services. 
As Central Americans substituted foreign assets for their 
domestic financial assets (and, given the relative importance 
of transactions costs, domestic inflation hedges for domestic 
financial assets), inflationary pressures were exacerbated, 
further repressing the domestic financial systems. 
The recent Central American experience has been clear-
ly characterized by an excessive emphasis on the fiscal-sup-
port functions of the domestic financial system. Emphasis 
on financing public-sector activities has led to a rapid 
expansion of domestic credit, in nominal terms, and the ac-
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celeration of inflation. As reported in the previous sec-
tions, in the race between growth of credit in nominal terms 
and inflation, eventually inflation has been the winner. 
Emphasis on financing public-sector activities has also 
resulted in the "crowding out" of the private sector from 
bank credit portfolios. In conclusion, the domestic 
financial system of the Central American countries has 
become much less of an intermediary between private savers 
and investors, and much more of a fiscal instrument, to tax 
resources away from wealthholders in order to finance cur-
rent public expenditures and, more recently, the service of 
an excessive public external debt. This lack of balance in 
the provision of financial services and abuse of its fiscal 
function has significantly jeopardized the ability of the 
domestic financial system to promote economic development 
and financial stability. The crisis, with its postponement 
of the required adjustment of aggregate spending, its in-
creasing foreign debt, and accelerating inflation and deval-
uation has increased financial repression in Central America. 
Foreign assistance, policy reforms, and resource mobilization 
When the Central American countries designed their 
protectionist strategies of developm~nt in the late 1950s and 
embarked upon the creation of the Central American Common 
Market, all the emphasis was placed on trade policies, in-
dustrialization, and structural transformation. With the 
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assistance and encouragement of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA), firt, and of the United 
States, later, the Central American Common Market provided 
for free trade within the region and the harmonization of 
tariff rates to a common external tariff schedule. 531 At-
tention concentrated on the current account of the balance 
of payments and on the potential growth and employment ef-
fects of the protectionist policies. 
At that time, growth models did not include a role for 
domestic resource mobilization through the financial sys-
tern. The marriage of neoclassical growth models with 
Keynesian macroeconomics overemphasized aggregation. Given 
an exogenous rate of population growth and an aggregate 
production function, output was viewed as a function of 
capital and growth was viewed as a function of investment. 
Capital accumulation, in turn, was seen as the result of 
both domestic and foreign savings. An structuralist view 
of the world resulted in the belief that the supply of 
savings was insufficient and completely inelastic. The 
problem of growth, therefore, became one of filling the two 
gaps: the difference between domestic savings and invest-
ment, given a desired rate of growth, and the difference 
between foreign exchange requirements and export earnings 
1 . 1 . fl 541 . f. . 1 . p us cap1ta 1n ows.-- Fore1gn 1nanc1a ass1stance was 
viewed as the means of obtaining the additional foreign 
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exchange required to maintain a high rate of growth, close 
the gap between the demand for imports thus generated and 
the region's regular export earnings, and complement domes-
tic savings. 55/ No active role was assigned to the domestic 
financial system. 
To the extent that savings were considered interest-
rate-inelastic, there was no scope for financial deposit 
mobilization. To the extent that there was a tendency to 
assume that all investment is good and to ignore that some 
investments yield much and others little, and still others 
bear negative yields, there was no appreciation of the 
allocative role of financial intermediation. 56/ Armed with 
Harrod/Domar equations, linear programming, and crude input-
output tables, planners targeted sectoral and subsectoral 
investment totals even when there were no projects, no 
levers to influence their creation, and no analysis to show 
that those would be good uses of scarce resources. Although 
problems of managing the economy in the short run, handling 
fluctuations and shocks, were neglected, cautious fiscal and 
monetary policies, coupled with international stability, 
facilitated investment and financial deepening. 
The Alliance for Progress Program was inspired in the 
1960s by this simplistic view of the world. Growth and devel-
opment were to be achieved through inflows of foreign finan-
cial assistance. In the process of aggregation, individual 
so 
production, consumption, investment, saving, and port-
folio choices were ignored. Relative prices, elasticities, 
and incentives were not taken into account. The impact of 
the institutional framework, political climate, size and 
role of the public sector and economic policy management on 
the profitability of investment, expectations, and resource 
allocation were not considered. Rather, the emphasis was 
on obstacles, bottlenecks, and constraints. If domestic 
savings were not sufficient, foreign financial assistance 
would complement them. If private investors did not find 
productive activities attractive, the public sector would 
borrow abroad and directly invest in productive enterprises. 
Unfortunately, in its economic analysis, the Kissinger 
Report has not gone much beyond this perspective. 57/ 
As indicated, the present economic crisis has resulted 
from both long-term, structural circumstances, and short-
term factors. The Kissinger Report stresses the latter. 
It would be a great mistake to believe that stagnation, 
low profitability, fiscal imbalance, and rigidity have a 
recent origen. Little consideration, if at all, is given 
in the Report to the choice of development strategy. 58/ 
Although the Report calls for "efforts to reinvigorate the 
Central American Economic Market" and claims that "support 
to the Common Market would be one of the quickest ways to 
revive intra-regional trade and economic activity," no 
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evaluation of the protectionist policies and of required 
policy reforms is offered. As a necessary condition for 
the recovery, a substantial increase in aid is recommended. 59/ 
The present economic situation in Central America 
requires important policy revisions, in order to regain 
the growth dynamics of the past and restablish financial 
stability. Most of these reforms are overdue. The required 
policy package must be directed towards promoting invest-
ment, increasing competitiveness in international markets 
and improving export performance, mobilizing a larger 
proportion of domestic savings, and channeling those savings 
more efficiently, through the financial system, towards 
more socially profitable activities, as well as regaining 
control of the public-sector finances, in order to avoid 
inflation and "crowding out." 
In some of the Central American countries these 
policy reforms must include a revision of e~change-rate 
policies. The futility of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
to trade as a mechanism for balance-of-payments or ex-
change-rate stability has to be understood. Lower and 
uniform tariffs, combined with realistic exchange rates, 
would encourage exports. Financial policies to promote 
the mobilization of voluntary deposits and increased com-
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petition in credit markets are also required. The policy 
reforms may also include a reduction in the size of the 
public sector, particularly in the area of productive enter-
prises, as well as a reduction of the multitude of explicit 
and implicit subsidies. 
There has been a long controversy about the extent and 
ways in which foreign financial assistance contributes to 
. h ' h 60 / ' ' h econom1c growt 1n t e LDCs.-- W1th1n the North-Sout 
debate, LDCs have claimed that a massive inflow of resources 
from the North is needed to accelerate growth and to reduce 
poverty in the South. Others, however, have emphasized the 
importance of self-help, well-functioning markets, and non-
distorting policies. A few have even claimed that the ab-
sence of foreign aid is almost a prerequisite for economic 
progress in the LDCs. 61/ The Kissinger Report emphasis the 
role of foreign financial assistance. 
The justification for increased aid is based on the 
presumption of a positive relationship between the volume of 
capital inflows and the rate of economic growth. This, in 
turn, is based oh the assumption that foreign funds will add 
to domestic savings, in order to increase total investment, 
and that efficiency will not benegatively affected by the 
inflow of foreign resources. Given the fungibility of funds, 
however, foreign resources may substitute for domestic savings, 
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increasing consumption or capital flight. 621 The net ad-
ditionality of foreign aid with respect to domestic in-
,. 
vestment will always be less than the actual amount of the 
financial inflow. Aid may also reduce the efficiency in 
the allocation of resources. To the extent to which aid 
allows an overvaluation of the domestic currency, it 
d . 63/ ~scourages exports.-- Also, foreign financial assis-
tance has frequently contributed to the unproductive in-
vestments and interventionist policies of many govern-
ments. As a leading Guatemalan recently claimed, "the 
combination of have-money-must-lend international ins-
titutions and spendthrift politicians has been one of the 
main causes of the sad state of economic affairs in Latin 
Arnerica.n 64/ 
Development depends on an improved allocation of all 
resources, domestic and foreign. Domestic economic policies 
(trade and price policies, incentives, taxes, and the size 
of the public sector, and financial deepening) crucially 
determine the "effectiveness" of domestic and foreign re-
sources. Too frequently, however, the availability of 
external financial assistance has made the maintainance of 
growth-reducing policies possible. Large amounts of finan-
cial assistance may take away the incentives to mobilize 
domestic resources. Large amounts of assistance may take 
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away the incentive for governments to create more ef-
ficient and equitable tax administrations and to promote 
the mobilization of voluntary domestic savings through 
local financial institutions. With large amounts of 
financial assistance, the Central American governments 
will be able to sustain the existing structures of pro-
tection that favor inefficient industries, tax the rural 
areas, and penalize exports. 
Too much foreign financial assistance may neutralize 
some of the healthy consequences of the crisis and allow 
governments to resist demands for policy reforms. By 
bailing the Central American governments out, it would 
make it possible for them not to undertake the desired 
reforms. Foreign assistance may also make it possible for 
these governments to continue entering productive sectors 
and sustaining large bureaucracies. So far, the public 
external debt has been the mechanism to postpone adjust-
ment and reforms. There is a great danger that foreign 
financial assistance may have exactly the same result. 
If a few years down the line, when political support for 
the increased flows of aid disappears, external assistance 
suddently comes to a halt, these countries may find out 
that they have built up their expenditures a lot, but have 
not mobilized their own resources to pay for the bill. 
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In the past, exceptional inflows of funds (during the 
"coffee boom," with the accelerating borrowing abroad, 
etc.) have always come to an end. When the period of 
substantial financial assistance is over, if the policy 
reforms are not made, the Central American economies 
will be weaker, more distorted, more unstable, perhaps 
even worse off. Policy reforms and emphasis on voluntary 
mobilization of domestic savings, on the other hand, are 
a prerequisite for the success of moderate levels of 
foreign financial assistance. 
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